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Introduction 
 
Why is it important to assess North America’s integration 
potential? Regional integration is one method countries use to 
solve commonly held problems, such as migration, security, and 
development. Migration, security, and development can be viewed 
as inter-related problems because they have in common the quest 
for a stable environment where individuals’ and states’ 
objectives can be realized. Individuals will choose to exit when 
they perceive the lack of economic opportunities and/or physical 
security in their home countries and believe that there are 
ample quantities of these two items in a neighboring country 
(Chang 1998). States seek to control immigration in order to 
maximize security and development in their countries (Rudolph 
2003). Political development also helps in the area of security 
by reducing the likelihood of civil conflict (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002) and external threats (Kugler et al. 1997). 
Economic development reduces the likelihood that individuals 
will seek the exit strategy. It also increases the likelihood 
that states will experience domestic stability and favorable 
relations with neighboring states. Economic development, 
therefore, becomes the linchpin in solving the associated 
problems of migration and security.  
 
The solution to the migration-security-development issue can 
therefore be conceptualized as a collective good because 
benefits are spread to all those involved, although not 
necessarily equally. However, collective goods are achieved 
through collective action, which is often difficult to carry out 
(Olson 1965). What are the main problems for achieving 
collective action and what form would this action take? Although 
there are many views associated with the collective action 
problem (Olson 1965; see also Ostrom 1990), I will focus on 
transaction costs with attention on how homogenous institutions 
lower such costs. Transaction costs are costs borne by firms 
when they operate in a foreign political and economic 
environment. Differences between the home and foreign 
environment increase costs due to the need for firms to adjust. 
Also, with increased transaction costs comes uncertainty of 
success since they will be departing from what is known to what 
is unknown. These extra costs can discourage firms from 
requesting that politicians deepen integration, thereby leading 
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to little or no action. In assessing North America’s current and 
future state of integration, it is important to examine the 
compatibility of the three partners in light of transaction 
costs.  
 
Collective action can take the form of regional integration. 
Regional integration is the establishment of collective decision 
making among states for the intention of establishing and 
regulating market flows (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1970). Market flows 
are the entries and exits of the factors of production (except 
land), as well as goods and services. The degree of integration 
refers to the degree of collective decision making. At one end 
is an intergovernmental arrangement in which states make common 
decisions but are autonomous in regulating those decisions. If a 
regional authority does exist, it serves at the pleasure of the 
individual states. On the opposite end is the supranational 
arrangement, in which regional institutions do exist and make 
decisions alongside intergovernmental arrangements or supersede 
member-states’ authority.  
 
Conditions of Regional Integration 
 
The literature provides several important variables for 
explaining the levels of integration. The power theories 
indicate that the asymmetric distribution of power is a more 
favorable condition for integration than a grouping of similarly 
powerful actors (Krasner 1976; Mattli 1999; Gilpin 1987 & 2001; 
Efird and Genna 2002; Genna and Hiroi 2004, 2005 & 2007). This 
is due to the ability of the preponderant power to coordinate 
efforts and distribute incentives to other members. In other 
words, the region must include a capable leader.  
 
Next is the compatibility of actors. Having a powerful regional 
neighbor alone cannot help the development of integration if 
there is wide preference disagreement (Efird and Genna 2002). 
Although the powerful country could force preferences on others 
in the region, the outcome would resemble an empire rather than 
a voluntary association of countries. In order to form a 
cohesive unit, political and economic environments must be 
similar in order to reduce transaction costs (Feng and Genna 
2003). Without compatibility, firms will assume a cost of having 
to adjust to foreign environments. Therefore, firms would prefer 
that regional integration develop between compatible actors so 
that the costs are low. The inclusion of firms in this 
explanation follows theories involving interactions between 
domestic groups and the interests represented in government 
policies (Genna and Hiroi 2004).  
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Institutional homogeneity can deepen integration for two 
reasons. One is the perceived reduction of the costs due to the 
effects that identity politics has on cooperation. Prior 
research has demonstrated that states that have a similar 
political identity also have similar policy preferences (Souva 
2004). Institutions can be defined as the set of rules and 
procedures that are deemed appropriate by the political leaders 
(March and Olsen 1984). Given this definition, individuals are 
assumed to make decisions based on institutional values (Peters 
1999). Similar institutions breed ideological similarities since 
they share a “co-evolutionary process” (Denzau and North 1994). 
Norms and institutions reinforce one another, and therefore a 
country’s institutions are viewed as the expected expression of 
their norms (Maoz and Russett 1993). Similar institutions, 
therefore, will correlate with similar preferences. 
  
The identity factor also provides a decision-making short cut 
that would facilitate cooperation because it greatly simplifies 
a rather complex set of cognitive processes. Research into the 
dynamics of in-group and out-group behavior has shown that 
cooperation is easier among those that share an identity than 
those that do not (Tajfel 1978). Simply being viewed as “one of 
us” will elicit the type of cooperation that would also include 
resource allocations (Tajfel 1978). This not only holds for 
individuals, but states as well. For example, Werner and Lemke 
(1997) demonstrate that alliances are more likely among similar 
states. With a similar identity, actors believe that cooperation 
is easier due to lower transaction costs.  
 
A material mechanism is another reason for why similar 
institutions can improve the deepening of integration. 
Entrepreneurs are faced with two realities; parts of their 
business enterprises are controllable and others are not. The 
controllable parts are those within their firms and operations. 
They include personnel, marketing, physical operations, etc. 
Those that they cannot control are found outside the firm. These 
factors are the political, economic, and social factors of a 
country. For example, a firm cannot control the economic climate 
at any given time. Also, they cannot control the institutional 
arrangement of a foreign country. There have been examples of 
large firms influencing regulations especially in small 
countries, but firms in general can at best lobby for their 
preferences at the margin. They are not believed to have the 
ability to produce revolutionary institutional change in a given 
country. Given this, firms are less likely to demand regional 
integration with neighbors that do not share similar 
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institutions because needing to adapt to new environments 
introduces greater costs and uncertainty.  
 
In sum, power preponderance and compatibility are the main 
conditions associated with the deepening of regional 
integration. A regional leader is needed for guiding the 
processes using available capabilities. Compatibility promotes 
the idea that states are similar enough in either perceived or 
material terms not to add additional transaction costs.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
I test the hypotheses using a panel time series linear 
regression technique that assumes correlated panels. Since such 
data properties produce inaccurate standard errors, a correction 
method is used (Beck and Katz 1995). AR(1) autocorrelation is 
assumed and the unit of analysis are the regional integration 
organizations from 1975-2004. The timeframe is bounded by data 
availability. The variables measuring regional integration, 
power preponderance, and institutional homogeneity are lagged by 
five years given the hypothesized direction of association.1 Five 
year lags were chosen in order to reduce endogeneity problems, 
to work with some data issues (see below), and to focus on a 
long-term examination. Control variables (see below) are lagged 
by one year while the regional dummy variables are not lagged. 
The remainder of this section describes the variables used in 
the model with the following specifications: 
 
Integrationt = 1 + 1Power Preponderancet-5 + 2Institutional 
Homogeneityt-5 + nControlst-1 + t 
 
The operationalization of regional integration is a systematic 
coding so that the analysis can distinguish varying levels while 
still comparing similar attributes. This is done by using a 
multidimensional measurement referred to as the integration 
achievement score (IAS), which was first developed by Hufbauer 
and Schott (1994) and later refined and applied in Efird and 
Genna 2002 (see also Efird, Genna, and Kugler 2003; Feng and 
Genna 2003; and Genna and Hiroi 2004). It gauges the level of 
                                                            
1 Lagged dependent variables were not used because as Achen (2001) points out, 
lagged dependent variables will dominate the results thereby destroying the 
effect of other variables when included with heavily trending exogenous 
variables and disturbances, regardless if the lagged dependent variable has 
any true causal power or not. In addition, the interest in this study is not 
in the change or growth in the level of integration, but the level of 
integration at a given time period. The lagged independent variables were 
included to better account for causality.  
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regional integration by looking at six categories commonly 
attributable to regionalism: (1) trade in goods and services, 
(2) degree of capital mobility, (3) degree of labor mobility, 
(4) level of supranational institution importance, (5) degree of 
monetary policy coordination, and (6) degree of fiscal policy 
coordination. Each of the six categories is also broken down 
into five levels along a Guttman scale. The measure is an equal 
weighted average of the six categories. The potential range of 
the score is from zero to five. Zero represents no formal 
regional integration in place and five represents a complete 
merger of markets, including all economic factors, and political 
decision-making.  
 
Power preponderance is relatively simple to operationalize using 
GDP data (in constant US dollars) from the World Development 
Indicators (2005). I calculate the variable by dividing the GDP 
of the largest economy by the sum of the GDPs of all remaining 
members. 
 
I operationalize institutional homogeneity using World Bank’s 
Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001) An index 
was created using three variables: “Legislative Indices of 
Electoral Competitiveness,” “Executive Indices of Electoral 
Competitiveness,” and “Checks and Balances.” A confirmatory 
factor analysis of the three variables indicated a strong 
association with a single latent variable (alpha=0.83). The 
values for each country were summed and a standard deviation was 
taken for each regional integration organization.  
 
The data analysis also includes the following control variables. 
The first is the presence of an ongoing crisis between members 
of the regional integration association. Intuitively, one would 
suspect that integration would not deepen under such 
circumstances. The data come from the International Crisis 
Behavior dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). The variable has 
a value of zero for the absence of an ongoing crisis and one 
otherwise. The second control, which is also found in the 
International Crisis Behavior dataset, is the presence of a new 
crisis during the year. Like ongoing crisis, a new crisis may 
threaten current or future integration efforts. The variable has 
a value of zero for no new crisis and one otherwise. The age of 
regional integration organization was also included because 
older organizations are more likely to have deeper integration. 
Integration may deepen due to the political will or persistent 
effort. The number of members was also included. Larger 
memberships may encounter greater collective action problems, 
which makes coordination among member states challenging. 
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Finally, regions could possess specific attributes that may 
influence the level of integration. I include regional dummy 
variables for Europe, Latin America, 2  the Middle East, and 
Africa. Asia is the baseline region.  
 
Results 
 
The regression model estimates the relationship of regional 
integration around the world with power asymmetry and 
institutional homogeneity while controlling for other factors. 
Overall the results support the hypothesis. 
 
Table 1. OLS (AR1) Regression with Correlated Panels Corrected Standard 
Errors 
  
IAS Standard 
Error 
Power Preponderance (t-5) 0.022** 0.011 
Institutional Variables
  
DPI Index, standard deviation (t-5) 0.017** 0.007 
Controls
  
ICB On Going Crisis (t-1) -0.010  0.028 
ICB New Crisis (t-1) -0.001  0.018 
Regional Organization Age (t-1) 0.015*** 0.002 
Regional Organization Membership Size 
(t-1)
-0.007*** 0.002 
Europe 1.42*** 0.086 
Latin America 0.635*** 0.088 
Middle East 0.428*** 0.140 
Africa 0.183** 0.089 
Constant 0.437*** 0.073 
Observations 534  
R2 0.346  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(one-tailed tests; except regional dummies which are two-tailed); 
the standard deviation variables were transformed (the negative 
of the standard deviation) so that the indices now measure 
institutional homogeneity.  
 
 
Table one presents the estimation results. The model one 
supports the hypothesis that a regional leader and homogeneous 
institutions among member-states are positively associated with 
the level of integration. The power preponderance variable is 
significant at the 95% confidence level (one-tail test). If the 
regional leader is as large as all other member-states combined 
(a ratio equal to one) then the level of integration is small. 
                                                            
2 I code NAFTA in the Latin America regional dummy.  
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At the maximum value of the power preponderance variable found 
in the data (~11), the effect would be 0.24 or a ten-fold 
increase from the value of parity. At the smallest value of 
preponderance found in the data (~0.17) the effect would be 
0.0037 or an 83% decrease from parity. Institutional homogeneity 
is significant at the 95% confidence level. From the variable’s 
lowest value to its highest value, the level of integration 
increases by 100%. The next column displays the results with the 
EFW measure for institutional homogeneity as the dependent 
variable. The integration score does help explain the level of 
homogeneity, but power preponderance does not. This finding, in 
association with the first model, points to power preponderance 
affecting the level of homogeneity indirectly, i.e. through its 
effect on the level of integration.  
 
Implications for North American Integration 
 
This analysis indicates that the optimal conditions for regional 
integration to develop are the presence of a preponderant power 
and compatibility among the member states. The condition of 
power asymmetry was demonstrated with the finding that the 
larger the GDP ratios (between the regional leader and the sum 
of all other members), the greater the regional integration 
score. The necessary condition of institutional compatibility 
was also demonstrated by the findings. Recall that these tests 
demonstrate a general relationship and not one that is exclusive 
to North America. Assuming that North American integration is 
not unique and is therefore comparable to all other cases, the 
general results give us an opportunity to see how North America 
compares with all other cases of regional integration. From this 
comparison, it becomes possible to make recommendations for 
deepening integration. The next step is to examine the estimated 
models in the North American case.  
 
One of the key variables, power asymmetry, is clearly present in 
the region. The GDP ratio between the US and Canada during 1989-
1993 was between 9.8-10.8. After the implementation of NAFTA, 
the ratio between the US and the other two partners varies 
between from 6.8 – 8.4. The data indicates a fairly wide 
variation in the homogeneity variables. The standard deviation 
of NAFTA’s DPI values ranges from 2.08-0.58. This section will 
examine the effect of this variable has on North American 
cooperation. 
 
Table two displays calculated North American integration 
scenarios using varying values of power preponderance and 
institutional homogeneity indicators. We begin with a baseline 
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Table 2. North American Integration Scenarios 
Scenarios Integration Score 
2004 1.34 
Low End Values 1.17 
High End Values 1.50 
Institutional Homogeneity (15 years) 2.32 
Institutional Homogeneity (30 years) 2.55 
 
examination before discussing potential scenarios that could 
deepen North American integration. The 2004 estimated value for 
NAFTA is 1.34 while the actual value is 1.67. Therefore we will 
need to keep in mind that the model underestimates the 
integration score’s value when examining future estimated 
values. The next entry includes North American values at the low 
end of the range for all the independent variables, while the 
third entry includes high end values. Note that these entries 
represent hypothetical scenarios; the actual data do not have 
these combinations of values. The point is to determine the 
bounded values of integration given historical precedence before 
expanding to other scenarios. At the historically lowest values, 
the predicted integration score is approximately 1.17. Using the 
European Union as a substantive comparison, the EU scored a 
value of one just before the implementation of the Treaty of 
Rome (1957). At this time the EU was a partial free trade area 
that also allowed foreign capital withdrawal. Regional 
institutions were limited to information gathering and had 
advisory roles. At NAFTA’s historically highest values, the 
estimated score is 1.50. This value represents a substantive 
change in the level of integration because it requires a one 
point increase in at least three categories of composite index. 
For example, the score increase could represent a change to a 
full free trade area, the ability for full access for foreign 
investment and capital withdrawal (except for national 
government procurement), and the ability for regional 
institutions to amend member state proposals. 
 
The next entries in table two provide results given improvements 
to institutional homogeneity between the three countries at 
different ages of NAFTA. I keep the power ratio at seven and 
also hold the membership at three. If the three had achieved 
perfect homogeneity when NAFTA turned 15 years old (in 2009), it 
is estimated that the value would be 2.32. Recall that the model 
underestimates the values, so this is a conservative estimate. 
What could such a value represent? Let’s again use the EU as a 
comparative example. It achieved this value in 1972 as the 
member-states began their earliest efforts in developing the 
common currency. The EU was a customs union, provided full 
access for foreign investment (except for national government 
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procurement), allowed capital withdrawal from member states, 
labor mobility among nationals of member states, included 
regional institutions that had the ability to amend proposals, 
and required member states to commitment to maintain parity in 
currency values. Therefore a one point increase in the 
integration score represents a great deal of change from NAFTA’s 
2004 score. Thinking into the future, what would NAFTA look like 
if member states achieve perfect institutional homogeneity when 
it turns 30 years old (in 2024)? The estimated value is 2.55, 
which is similar to the value of the EU in 1975.3 In 1975, the EU 
improved integration since 1972 by allowing European 
institutions to veto proposals.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The literature on regional integration has fashioned various 
theories and empirical findings. The conditions distilled in 
this paper are power asymmetry and partner compatibility. First, 
I evaluated the empirical validity of these conditions and then 
compared the general models with the North American experience. 
My goal was to assess North America’s potential for deepening 
integration; does it have the “right stuff” to develop 
agreements that furthers integration? The rationale is that 
collective action through trilateral agreements would be the 
most effective way to solve the migration-security-development 
issue.  
 
The general findings confirm that specific conditions are 
needed. First is the presence of a regional leader. The 
statistical results show that greater asymmetry is associated 
with greater levels of integration in general. The presence of 
the leader was theorized to be necessary in order to solve some 
problems of collective action (coordinate efforts and distribute 
incentives). However valid this variable is in general, it does 
not extensively help us to explain North American integration 
since the US has been a regional (and global) preponderant power 
for some time.  
 
The second condition was compatibility of members. The results 
indicate that domestic institutional homogeneity is a good 
predictor for integration. It is in this area that we see a good 
deal of variation among the North American states. Compatibility 
is stronger in the northern partnership than the southern 
partnership, which produced an unbalanced compatibility problem. 
Therefore the policy recommendations are geared to improving the 
                                                            
3 The actual value was 3.167. 
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compatibility between Mexico and Canada-US if further 
integration is desired. 
 
One set of recommendations involves homogenizing institutions. 
There are two points here. The first is the effort to improve 
democratic institutions in Mexico. Mexico is already on upward 
trajectory in this area, but still falls short. Given the high 
levels of corruption, democratic institutions have credibility 
problems. Also the Mexican president’s powers are not as 
constrained as those of the executives from Canada and the US. 
The second recommendation is to reduce the differences involving 
legal structures, the security of property rights, and 
regulation of labor and business. Regarding the legal 
structures, the deepening of integration would benefit from the 
Mexican judiciary becoming more independent, impartial, and 
increasing its integrity. Also, there will need to be some sort 
of convergence in the protection of property rights. Regarding 
the regulation of labor and business, there needs to be a 
convergence in the regulation of workers’ rights regarding 
hiring and terminating employment. Work also needs to be done in 
converging business regulations and the reduction of the use of 
bribes in Mexico.  
 
Overall, North America does not currently have the appropriate 
conditions that would improve integration at the moment. While a 
power asymmetry is in place, the compatibility of three partners 
is unbalanced. But a two-pronged policy of improving homogeneity 
while increasing integration can very well promote a virtuous 
cycle that continues to unite the economies and decision making 
of the three countries. The need to solve problems like the 
migration-security-development issue requires collective action 
because unilateral action thus far has proven to be 
unsuccessful. The limiting factor of the three issues is 
development, which integration has the potential to solve. By 
recognizing that the problem is a commonly held one, the three 
partners can begin to seek out the conditions, and make the 
appropriate adjustments, for cooperation to develop. Otherwise 
we will see future elections that mechanically focus on 
solutions that do not produce results.  
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